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THREE VITAL ISSUES: INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POWER, AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS-OCTOBER 2009 TERM
Michael C. Dorf and Erwin Chemerinsky
I. MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO: THE BASIS AND SCOPE OF
THE INCORPORATION DOCTRINE
PROFESSOR DORF: In McDonald v. City of Chicago,' the
Supreme Court held that the Constitution restricts the ability of state
and local governments to ban the possession of handguns.2 The rul-
ing follows the Court's controversial decision, District of Columbia
v. Heller,3 in which the Court held that the Second Amendment
"right of the people to keep and bear [a]rms" 4 protects the right to
private possession of a handgun for the defense of one's self and
one's family in the home.' On its face, however, Heller only limited
the federal government. Three cases from the Nineteenth Century
held that the Second Amendment is not applicable to state and local
governments.6 The issue in McDonald was whether those cases re-
Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. This Article is based
on a presentation given at the Practising Law Institute's Twelfth Annual Supreme Court Re-
view in New York, New York on August 3, 2010.
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Twenty-Second Annual Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court Review in Central Islip, New York
on November 5, 2010.
I 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
2 Id. at 3050.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
s See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
6 See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) ("[It is well settled that the restrictions of
[the Second] amendment[] operate only upon the federal power, and have no reference what-
ever to proceedings in state courts."); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (stating
that the Second Amendment is one which "has no other effect than to restrict the powers of
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mained good law.
Otis McDonald, who lived in a high crime neighborhood in
Chicago, claimed that he needed a handgun for home protection be-
cause the police failed to adequately perform their duties.8 In the Su-
preme Court, his case produced the same five-to-four conserva-
tive/liberal ideological split as Heller did, except that in McDonald,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor replaced retired Justice David Souter among
the four dissenting Justices. 9 Yet despite the predictable breakdown,
McDonald involved an interesting doctrinal twist and a surprising po-
tential implication.
McDonald concerned the incorporation doctrine, under which
the Court had previously held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes
"most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights" applicable against the
states.'o The Justices considered, but ultimately rejected, the possi-
bility of abandoning the Due Process Clause in favor of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause as the basis for incorporation." They then
hinted at potentially far-reaching implications of such a decision for
future cases involving the use of juries in state courts.12
To understand McDonald and its implications, it is helpful to
start at the beginning. The language of two separate provisions of the
Bill of Rights-the First Amendment, which specifically refers to
"Congress," and the second clause of the Seventh Amendment, which
the national government"); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) ("The
second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means
no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that
has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government . . . .").
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031 (referring to the Court's Nineteenth Century decisions that
held that the Second Amendment only applied to the federal government, but indicating that
these decisions "do not preclude [the Court] from [re]considering whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right binding on the
States").
8 Id at 3026-27.
9 Compare id at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and id at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(joining in Justice Breyer's dissent were Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor), with Hel-
ler, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joining in Justice Stevens' dissent were Justice
Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer).
10 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026, 3034.
" See id. at 3030 (refusing to reconsider and "hold that the right to keep and bear arms is
one of the 'privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' " (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1)).
12 See id. at 3046 n.30 (noting that cases holding "that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Seventh Amendment's civil jury requirement do not apply to the States"
were decided prior to the era of the modern incorporation method).
126 [Vol. 27
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refers to federal courts-clearly implies that these provisions place
limitations only on federal action.' 3  "The balance of the Bill of
Rights, however, sets out rights of the People that, taken at face val-
ue, could be said to bar infringements by the states and their
sub[]divisions as well as by the federal government." 4
Yet, this was not how the Bill of Rights was originally un-
derstood. In the first Congress, James Madison proposed an amend-
ment that would bar states from violating "the equal rights of con-
science, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal
cases." 5 "The proposal was defeated, largely because Madison's fel-
low representatives saw the Bill of Rights as a check on the federal
government alone."1 6  The founders thought that "[s]tate constitu-
tions . . . already provided whatever rights were needed against state
(and local) violations."l7 In Barron v. City of Baltimore,18 the Su-
preme Court confirmed that the original Bill of Rights only limited
the federal government.' 9
Following Barron, the law remained unchanged until 1868,
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.20 It states, in relevant
part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances."); U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("[Nlo fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.").
14 Michael C. Dorf, Does the Second Amendment Bind the States?, FINDLAW (Oct. 6,
2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20091007.html.
1 Amendment I (Speech and Press): Congress, Amendments to the Constitution, THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/amendl_
speechsl4.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
16 Dorf, supra note 14.
17 id.
32 U.S. 243 (1833).
See id. at 250-51. ("In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted,
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments
demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government not
against those of the local governments. .. . These amendments contain no expression indicat-
ing an intention to apply them to the state governments.").
20 Primary Documents in American History: 14th Amendment to the US. Constitution,
LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/14thamendment.html (last
visited Jan. 11, 2011).
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process of law. ... 2
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment appears to be a quite natural way of saying that the Bill
of Rights, formerly thought to limit only the federal government, now
placed limitations on the states as well. Under such a straightforward
interpretation, the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States"-that is, the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights-are pro-
tected against infringement by each "State."
In fact, there is substantial evidence that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was expected to incorporate the Bill of Rights
against the States.22 Article IV of the original Constitution protects
against interstate discrimination with regard to "all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."23 In Corfield v. Co-
ryell,24 Justice Bushrod Washington, a nephew of the first President,
famously interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause as encom-
passing those fundamental rights enjoyed by "citizens of all free gov-
ernments." 25 The framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
were well aware of Corfield, and by choosing to parallel the Article
IV language to the language of the decision, they can be understood
to have intended to adopt its approach.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected this broad interpreta-
tion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause shortly after its adoption
in the Slaughter-House Cases.26  The Court read the Privileges or
Immunities Clause very narrowly.2 7  Essentially, the Court inter-
preted the Clause to recognize only those rights already protected by
the language and structure of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment Consti-
tution.2 Since the Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases,
21 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026, 3046.
23 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
24 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
25 Id. at 551.
26 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
27 See id at 36-83; see also id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting) ("The construction adopted
by the majority of my brethren is, in my judgment, much too narrow. It defeats, by a limita-
tion not anticipated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed and of those by
whom it was adopted.").
28 Id. at 75 (majority opinion) (stating that "[tihere can be but little question that the pur-
pose of both these provisions [the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment] is the same, and that the pri-
vileges and immunities intended are the same in each").
128 [Vol. 27
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been treated as nearly a dead
letter.29
Yet, as most Americans know, the Bill of Rights does indeed
limit the states and their subdivisions. State officials cannot ban po-
litical rallies or coerce confessions from criminal suspects without
violating the First and Fifth Amendments, respectively.30 Given Bar-
ron and the Slaughter-House Cases, what makes these and other pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states? The answer is
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3'
In a series of Twentieth Century cases, the Court held that
most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights do impose limitations on
the states, after all.32 For example, in order to deprive a person of his
life, due process requires the State to give him a trial by jury as set
forth in the Sixth Amendment.33 To deprive a person of his freedom
from "unreasonable searches and seizures," due process requires that
the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment be honored.34
29 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3060-61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Court
has marginalized the Privileges or Immunities Clause and that the "last word" on the clause
was in the Nineteenth Century).
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing "the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble"); U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law").
31 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (incorpo-
rating the First Amendment restrictions upon regulations relating to speech, religion, and
association); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment's exception
from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgment by the States.").
32 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (listing the various Bill of Rights
provisions which have been incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 122
(1978) (holding that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment "is made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)
("We hold today that the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the states in the same manner as it has with respect to the federal
government).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 ("Because we believe
that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which ...
would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.").
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (noting that "the Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have excluded
5
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The Due Process Clause works well as a basis for incorpora-
tion of the procedural rights in the foregoing examples. However, it
provides an awkward textual basis for incorporating more substantive
rights, such as the First Amendment's protection of speech and the
press. Such rights do not merely require the government to provide
trials for political dissidents; they forbid prosecution for sedition out-
right."
Nonetheless, under a doctrine that has come to be known as
"substantive due process," the Court held that the Due Process Clause
has a substantive component. Under this approach, no amount of fair
process suffices to infringe certain fundamental substantive liberties,
so that any unwarranted substantive infringement is, ipso facto, a vi-
olation of due process. 36
Academics and Supreme Court Justices alike have long been
troubled by the seemingly oxymoronic character of the substantive
due process doctrine.37 The late law professor and dean, John Hart
Ely, likened it to "green pastel redness."3 8  The late Justice Hugo
Black attempted to circumvent substantive due process by arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole, including the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, accomplishes incorporation. 39  Justice Cla-
rence Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Saenz v. Roe,40 suggested
that the Slaughter-House Cases might be overruled and, if that were
from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized" is applicable against the states).
3 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1956).
[E]nforcement of state sedition acts presents a serious danger of conflict
with the administration of the federal program. Since 1939, in order to
avoid a hampering of uniform enforcement of its program by sporadic
local prosecutions, the Federal Government has urged local authorities
not to intervene in such matters, but to turn over to the federal authorities
immediately and unevaluated all information concerning subversive ac-
tivities.
Id.
36 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (discussing the rela-
tion between procedural and substantive due process).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alleging
substantive due process is an oxymoron rather than a constitutional right); see also JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDiCIAL REvIEw 18 (1938) (contend-
ing that substantive due process is a contradiction).
38 ELY, supra note 37, at 18.
3 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3033 ("[Justice Black's] theory held that § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment totally incorporated all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.").
4 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
130 [Vol. 27
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to occur, some of the work now done by the Due Process Clause
could be attributed to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.41
Similarly, Justice Scalia, the author of the Court's opinion in
Heller, has been one of the most vocal critics of substantive due
process. 42 That doctrine, after all, is the basis for the Court's recog-
nition of unenumerated rights such as those protecting abortion and
same-sex sexual conduct.43 The Constitution does not mention these
rights, Scalia says, and therefore the Court has no business recogniz-
ing or enforcing them."
Perhaps in a bid to gamer the votes of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the lawyers for the petitioners in McDonald made a bold
gamble: Rather than principally relying on the Due Process Clause as
the basis for incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states,
they urged the Court to base its ruling on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.45
Only Justice Thomas agreed with the petitioners' sugges-
tion.46 In his concurring opinion in McDonald, Justice Thomas stated
that "[t]he notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only
'process' before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could
define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most
41 Id. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (speculating "that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause will become yet another convenient tool for inventing new rights" and as such the
Court should "consider whether the Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of
our equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence").
42 See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that he views substantive
due process as an oxymoron rather than a constitutional right).
43 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) ("The Constitution does not expli-
citly mention any right of privacy. [However,] the Court has recognized that a right of per-
sonal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Con-
stitution."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The State cannot demean [a
same sex couple's] existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct
a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to en-
gage in their conduct without intervention of the government.").
44 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The entire practice of using the Due Process Clause to add judicially favored rights to the
limitations upon democracy set forth in the Bill of Rights (usually under the rubric of so-
called 'substantive due process') is in my view judicial usurpation.").
45 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028 ("Petitioners' primary submission is that this right is
among the 'privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' . . . . As a secondary
argument, petitioners contend that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause 'incor-
porates' the Second Amendment right.").
4 Id. at 3058-59 (Thomas, J., concurring) (indicating that "the right to keep and bear arms
is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause").
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casual user of words."4 7 By contrast, he argued that linguistic gym-
nastics are not necessary to read the Privileges or Immunities Clause
as applying the Bill of Rights to the states.48
The balance of the Court decided to stick with the Due
Process Clause. 4 9 Although acknowledging the persistent academic
criticism of the Slaughter-House Cases, these eight other Justices
nonetheless believed that the existing doctrine should be retained as
stable and workable.5 0 Both the plurality and the dissenting Justices
noted that shifting the doctrinal basis for incorporation of the Bill of
Rights against the states to the Privileges or Immunities Clause would
itself create uncertainties, as scholars disagree over the exact meaning
of the Clause.
Although the Court was nearly unanimous in rejecting the
proposed shift from the Due Process Clause to the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, the Justices were sharply divided about whether the
Due Process Clause should be interpreted to incorporate the Second
Amendment.52 The attorneys for the petitioners argued in the alter-
native for incorporation of the Second Amendment against the states
under the Due Process Clause, and the four Justices who accepted
that argument concurred with Justice Thomas, thereby providing the
47 Id at 3062.
48 id.
This Court's substantive due process framework fails to account for both
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the history that led to its
adoption, filling that gap with a jurisprudence devoid of a guiding prin-
ciple. I believe the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of-
fers a superior alternative, and that a return to that meaning would allow
this Court to enforce the rights the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to
protect with greater clarity and predictability than the substantive due
process framework has so far managed.
Id.
49 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (plurality opinion) (clarifying that the Court was consi-
dering "whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms [was] incorporated in
the concept of due process").
'0 See id at 3029-31 ("[T]his Court's decisions ... do not preclude us from considering
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amend-
ment right binding on the States.").
" Id. at 3030-31 (declining to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause as its doctrinal ba-
sis for incorporation); id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality that the
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is unclear and should not be used as a basis
for incorporation).
52 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3048-50 (plurality opinion).
132 [Vol. 27
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss1/6
THREE VITAL ISSUES
*53petitioners with a victory.
How did the self-styled "textualists" justify their continued re-
liance on the Due Process Clause as the basis for incorporation? As
Justice Scalia explained when elucidating his own reasoning, these
Justices were willing to accept substantive due process as a basis for
incorporating the Bill of Rights because, when used for this purpose
only, the doctrine is " 'long established and narrowly limited.' "54
Justice Stevens, however, thought that this move-and the parallel
one in the majority opinion authored by Justice Alito-was too
slick. 5 Justice Stevens was not persuaded.
Why not? Presumably, the Justices who joined Justice Sca-
lia's opinion believed that invoking substantive due process solely for
purposes of incorporating the Bill of Rights is a narrowly-limited
analytical move, because doing so only permits the Court to recog-
nize rights that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution's text,
whereas recognizing a more freestanding kind of substantive due
process is a gambit that cannot be cabined: It permits justices, for in-
stance, to decide whether unenumerated rights such as "abortion, as-
sisted suicide, . . . homosexual sodomy," and contraception are pro-
tected by the Constitution.56
However, Justice Stevens noted that this supposed limitation
imposed via incorporation is illusory because the Court has not simp-
ly held that all of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights apply
against the states.57 Rather, the Court has engaged in "selective in-
corporation," thereby finding that most, but not all, enumerated rights
bind the states.5  Thus, according to Justice Stevens, the Justices ex-
ercised discretion in applying the incorporation doctrine, just as they
have exercised discretion in applying substantive due process to rec-
s Id. at 3036, 3050.
54 Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275
(1994)).
ss Id. at 3120 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that he "would proceed more cautiously"
and that the majority's decision disregards the work accomplished thus far to guarantee
many of our freedoms).
56 Id. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring).
5 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It follows that the term 'incor-
poration,' like the term 'unenumerated rights,' is something of a misnomer.").
" Id. at 3094 ("[W]e have never accepted a 'total incorporation' theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment, whereby the Amendment is deemed to subsume the provisions of the Bill of
Rights en masse.").
2011] 133
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ognize unenumerated rights. 9 Incorporation, Stevens argued, is a
"misnomer" because selective incorporation is a "subset" of substan-
tive due process.o
The majority's response to Justice Stevens was surprising. It
does not appear that Justice Alito conceded that incorporation has
been selective.6' Instead, he rather strongly suggested that if faced
with the question, the Court might hold that the Due Process Clause
incorporates the entire Bill of Rights against the states-without any
selection of any particular subset of rights at all. 62 In a footnote, Jus-
tice Alito noted that only four other provisions of the Bill of Rights
had not, at the time of the decision, been incorporated against the
states: the Third Amendment prohibition on peacetime quartering of
soldiers; the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment; the
grand jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment; and the Seventh
Amendment right to a civil jury.63 Justice Alito explained that the
Court never had an opportunity to decide whether the Due Process
Clause incorporates the Third Amendment or the Excessive Fines
Clause." Moreover, and more startlingly, he observed that the
Court's "decisions regarding the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Seventh Amendment's civil jury requirement
long predate the era of selective incorporation."65
That disclaimer exactly mirrored what the Court said in Hel-
ler about the Nineteenth Century cases, which rejected the incorpora-
tion of the Second Amendment against the states.66 And just as the
language in Heller was widely read to presage the incorporation hold-
ing in McDonald, the language in McDonald could also be read to fo-
' Id. at 3118 ("The judge must exercise judgment, to be sure. When answering a consti-
tutional question to which the text provides no clear answer, there is always some amount of
discretion; our constitutional system has always depended on judges' filling in the docu-
ment's vast open spaces.").
6o Id. at 3092-93.
61 See id at 3050 (plurality opinion).
62 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034 ("While Justice Black's theory [of total incorporation]
was never adopted, the Court eventually moved in that direction by initiating what has been
called a process of 'selective incorporation,' i.e., the Court began to hold that the Due
Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amend-
ments.").
63 Id. at 3035 n.13.
64 Id
65 id.
66 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
[Vol. 27134
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reshadow future decisions incorporating the civil jury and grand jury
requirements. Likewise, language in another footnote in the majority
opinion indicates the Court's willingness to overrule its decision in
Apodaca v. Oregon,67 which permitted states to convict criminal de-
fendants with a non-unanimous jury.68
To be sure, the plurality opinion in McDonald does not guar-
antee that the Court will incorporate the few remaining unincorpo-
rated rights against the states.69 Indeed, the structure of the Court's
opinion implies that there is a good chance it may not.70
If the majority viewed incorporation as automatic, then most
of the McDonald opinion would have been unnecessary. Rather than
simply stating that the Second Amendment is part of the Bill of
Rights and therefore is incorporated against the states, the Court ex-
tensively analyzed the historical record in an effort to "decide wheth-
er the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to [the American]
scheme of ordered liberty" or, in what the Court took to be an alterna-
tive formulation of the same question, "whether the right is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' ,71 That test leaves
open the possibility, at least in principle, that a provision of the Bill
of Rights might not be fundamental or deeply rooted, and thus might
not be incorporated against the states.
Accordingly, one must be careful not to read too much into
Justice Alito's footnotes discussing the as-yet-unincorporated rights.
However, one should also not read too little into them. There was no
need for the Court to say anything at all about the grand jury and civil
67 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
68 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.14 (reasoning that the "ruling [in Apodaca] was the
result of an unusual division among the Justices, not an endorsement of the two-track ap-
proach to incorporation").
69 See id. at 3032-35 (discussing the Court's initiation of selective incorporation, but fail-
ure to ever adopt Justice Black's total incorporation theory).
Only a handful of the Bill of Rights protections remain unincorporated
.... In addition to the right to keep and bear arms (and the Sixth
Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict), the only rights not fully
incorporated are (1) the Third Amendment's protection against quarter-
ing of soldiers; (2) the Fifth Amendment's grand jury indictment re-
quirement; (3) the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases;
and (4) the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines.
Id. at 3034-35 & n.13.
70 See id at 3032-33 (plurality opinion).
n Id. at 3036 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149); McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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jury requirements.72 In going out of its way to say that these rights
could be applicable against the states, the Justices in the plurality
must have realized that they would be inviting litigation over those
questions.
Should such litigation succeed, it would be extraordinarily
costly to the states. "The vast majority of civil actions filed in the
United States are filed in state courts, and the vast majority of those
[filed] are resolved without the use of a jury."73
To read the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments as
requiring juries in a substantial fraction of these cas-
es-as suggested by the McDonald footnote-would
slow down already overcrowded dockets, leading to
long delays, increased costs for litigants, and the in-
convenience of more frequent jury duty for all citi-
zens. Likewise, states that do not [require] grand ju-
ries to issue indictments would need to upend their
criminal justice systems, which would be both disrup-
tive and costly.74
Does the Court in McDonald really mean to say that it is open
to imposing such potentially heavy costs? Perhaps. In response to
Chicago's argument that the Second Amendment should not be made
applicable to the states because of the threat firearms present to pub-
lic safety, the Court essentially said, too bad.7 5 Noting that other
constitutional limits on the criminal justice system also carried costs
for public safety, Justice Alito implied that such costs were simply
not the Court's concern. 6 If that is the Court's attitude towards costs
measured in lives, it is hard to envision the Justices giving a more
sympathetic ear to an argument that the incorporation of some right
would lead to high costs measured simply in dollars.
In the end, the best hope for avoiding the costly imposition on
7 Id. at 3035 n.13 (discussing grand jury and civil jury requirements).
7 Michael C. Dorf, The Potentially Far-Reaching Implications of the Supreme Court's
Ruling that the Second Amendment Binds the States, FINDLAW (June 29, 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100629.html.
74 Id
7 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045 ("Municipal respondents cite no case in which we have
refrained from holding that a provision of the Bill of Rights is binding on the States on the
ground that the right at issue has disputed public safety implications.").
76 Id.
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the states of civil jury and grand jury requirements may rest on cynic-
ism. The Justices in the McDonald plurality do not appear to believe
that forbidding state and local government handgun bans imposes a
cost at all; indeed, the opening pages of the plurality opinion imply
that since the enactment of Chicago's handgun ban, "the City's hand-
gun murder rate ... actually increased." 7 In a quite different type of
case-such as one in which a state tort plaintiff seeks a civil jury to
adjudicate his state law claim-one or more members of the McDo-
nald majority might be more sympathetic to the state's arguments re-
garding costs. Or, if that rationale would be too obviously result-
driven (with costs invoked in one case, but ignored in another), the
Justices of the McDonald plurality could simply examine the histori-
cal evidence and find that the grand jury and civil jury rights are not
as "deeply rooted" as the right to keep and bear arms.
Of course, opting to follow such a course would result in a
different sort of cost. It would be a tacit admission that Justice Ste-
vens was right in his parting blow: Incorporation, no less than frees-
tanding substantive due process, requires the exercise of value-laden
judgment.7 ' That would be a fitting, if ironic, retirement gift for Jus-
tice Stevens.
DEAN CHEMERINSKY: The practical significance of
McDonald is that it opens the courthouse doors, federal and state, to
challenge all forms of gun laws: criminal laws that have a gun com-
ponent and civil regulatory statutes. The crucial question will be:
What level of scrutiny and what standard of review should be used
for this right? The Court, in its opinion, gives almost no guidance.
The little guidance the Court provides is the reference, in both the
majority and dissent, to the opinion in Heller, which stated that the
Second Amendment is not absolute. 79 Therefore, this case is really
an open invitation to litigation.
The Court appears unwilling to choose a formal level of scru-
tiny, which may imply that it will use a balancing test in the future.
On the one hand, the Court will likely not apply a strict scrutiny test
because it recognizes the need for more gun laws. While on the other
hand, the Court in a footnote in Heller made clear that it is using
n Id. at 3026 (plurality opinion).
78 Id. at 3119 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 See id. at 3047 (majority opinion); id at 3103-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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more than rational basis review.8 0 The Court will likely look to fac-
tors such as the location of the gun (providing more protection for
guns in the home than outside the home), the nature of the weapon,
and, the justification for the regulation. Until the Supreme Court
makes this determination, it is left to the lower courts to struggle and
decide which gun laws are constitutional and which are unconstitu-
tional.
II. UNITED STATES V. COMSTOCK: THE COURT'S VIEW ON THE
POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
United States v. Comstock' involved a provision of the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.82 The Act provided
that a person "in the custody of the [Federal] Bureau of Prisons" can
be deemed sexually dangerous and then be subject to continued con-
finement after he has finished his sentence from the criminal convic-
tion.83 Specifically, the Act requires that the United States Attorney
offer in federal court "clear and convincing evidence" to declare a
person sexually dangerous, thereby enabling the Court to confine the
person indefinitely. 84 The federal court is then required to conduct a
review of its determination every six months.
Comstock involved five defendants who joined together on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.86 Comstock himself was
convicted of violating the Federal Child Pornography Law87 and was
80 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 n.27 ("[T]he same [rational-basis scrutiny] test could not be
used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right,
be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or
the right to keep and bear arms.").
81 (Comstock l), 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
82 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 120 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.).
8 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(a) (West 2010).
8 Id. § 4248(a), (d).
8 Comstock 1, 130 S. Ct. at 1955 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 4247(e)(1)(B), (h) (West 2010))
("The statute establishes a system for ongoing psychiatric and judicial review of the individ-
ual's case, including judicial hearings at the request of the confined person at six-month in-
tervals.").
86 Id. at 1955-56.
87 United States v. Comstock (Comstock II), 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 (E.D.N.C. 2007)
("Graydon Comstock pled guilty on 4 October 2000 to one count of 'Receipt [by computer]
of materials depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct' . . . .").
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sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison. 8 Just days prior to the
completion of his sentence, the United States Attorney made an ap-
plication in the federal court to declare him as sexually dangerous.89
The federal court found that the United States Attorney proved by
clear and convincing evidence that Comstock was sexually danger-
ous, and as a result, Comstock has been imprisoned for approximate-
ly three years beyond the time of his original thirty-seven month sen-
tence. 90
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
an opinion by Judge Motz, declared the Act unconstitutional because
it exceeded the scope of Congress's power.91 Judge Motz held that
Congress did not have the authority to pass this law under the Com-
merce Clause, or, in the alternative, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 92 The Supreme Court, however, in a seven-to-two decision,
reversed and upheld the constitutionality of the federal law. 93
In 1997, in Kansas v. Hendricks,94 the Supreme Court held
that states are permitted to provide for the indefinite commitment of
sexually dangerous individuals even after they finished their sen-
tences.95 The issue in Comstock was not whether the government vi-
olates due process or individual liberties when it indefinitely confines
sexually dangerous individuals-that issue was already decided in
" Id. at 526.
89 Id.
90 Id. (noting that his term of imprisonment expired in 2006, yet he is still confined at FCI-
Butner).
91 United States v. Comstock (Comstock Ill), 551 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2009) ("The
Constitution does not empower the federal government to confine a person solely because of
asserted 'sexual dangerousness' when the Government need not allege (let alone prove) that
this 'dangerousness' violates any federal law.").
92 Id. at 278-79 (explaining that the Act could only be upheld under the Commerce Clause
"if it regulates activities that 'substantially affect' interstate commerce" (citing United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000))). "[P]recedent . .. compels the conclusion that [the
Act] does not constitute a valid exercise by Congress of its Commerce Clause power." Id at
280. The court also indicated that "[t]he Necessary and Proper Clause simply does not-in
and of itself-create any Congressional power." Id.
93 Comstock I, 130 S. Ct. at 1970.
9 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
9 Compare Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at Al
(indicating that "the state [may] confine certain violent sex offenders in mental hospitals af-
ter they have served their criminal sentences"), with Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364 (holding that
civil confinement of a violent sex offender who served a criminal sentence and who has been
deemed to have a "mental abnormality" is constitutional).
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Hendricks.96 Comstock, instead, pertained to federal power; specifi-
cally, whether Congress had the authority to pass such a law when
the Supreme Court previously stated that the individual states could
do so.9 In order to understand the decision, it is necessary to ex-
amine the split among the Justices. The only way to understand the
decision, and especially the split among the Justices, is in the context
outlined above. Justice Breyer wrote the seven-person majority opi-
nion with only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting.98
Justice Breyer stated that Congress had the authority to pass
the law under the Necessary and Proper Clause." He set forth five
reasons to demonstrate why the law fell within the scope of the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause, but all five reasonsoo can be reduced to
the following: (1) if Congress has the authority to make something a
federal crime, then Congress can prescribe the sanctions, including
the punishments for the crime; (2) if Congress has the ability to make
child pornography a federal crime using the Commerce Clause, then
Congress may provide prisons to house those guilty of the crime, es-
tablish mental hospitals to commit those guilty of the crime if they
are mentally ill, and prescribe what the sanctions will be if found
guilty; (3) the sanctions that Congress may prescribe include civil
commitment; and (4) civil commitment was previously available at
the federal level, and therefore, it was within the purview of the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause. 101
In writing the opinion, Justice Breyer omits and assumes a
key step in the Court's analysis. Most law professors, in constitu-
tional law classes, teach their students that the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not, by itself, provide Congress with sufficient authority
to act. Instead, it must be used in conjunction with some other feder-
al power. 102 Certainly, Justice Breyer is right in saying that the Ne-
96 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
9 ComstockI, 130 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
9 Id. at 1953.
* Id. at 1965.
' Id. ("[The considerations] include: (1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
(2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the sta-
tute's enactment in light of the Government's custodial interest in safeguarding the public
from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute's accommodation of state in-
terests, and (5) the statute's narrow scope.").
"o1 See id. at 1958-63.
102 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (claiming
that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not permit Congress to regulate intrastate com-
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cessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to take any reasonable
steps to carry out its powers,os but there needs to be a clear explana-
tion as to which underlying federal power the Necessary and Proper
Clause is serving. In this case, the Supreme Court does not offer
such an explanation, which is troubling because it gives law students
the impression-and maybe lower federal court judges as well-that
an analysis of whether Congress has power to act rests solely on a
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause without having to focus
on any underlying federal powers.
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented" and, at first glance,
that might seem unusual. In Hendricks, when the Supreme Court de-
termined that states were permitted to pass this law providing for in-
definite commitment of sexually dangerous individuals, Justices Sca-
lia and Thomas were part of the majority; Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Stevens, who are in the majority in Comstock, dissented in Hen-
dricks.'05 However, the difference can be explained by the distinct
issue in Hendricks, which required the Court to consider whether the
law violated individual liberty by permitting indefinite 'commit-
ment.' 6
In Comstock, the issue was one of federal power.107  It has
been the case throughout most of American history, and certainly
over the last several decades, that conservatives want to narrow the
scope of federal power while liberals want to broaden it. The liberal
Justices on the Court worry that narrowing the scope of Congress's
authority would put federal environmental laws and federal civil
rights laws in jeopardy' 08 Thus, in that context, it is not surprising
that Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, and Justices Scalia and
merce, but used in conjunction with the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate
interstate commerce as it deems necessary or appropriate).
103 Comstock I, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (describing Congress's broad power to enact laws under
the Necessary and Proper Clause).
10 See id. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joining in this dissent was Justice Scalia).
105 Compare Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 348 (depicting the split among the Justices with Jus-
tices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia forming the majority), with Comstock 1, 130 S. Ct. at
1953 (reflecting the seven-to-two split among the Justices in which Justices Breyer, Gins-
burg, and Stevens were in the majority).
'0 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-61.
'o' See Comstock I, 130 S. Ct. at 1954 ("Here we ask whether the Federal Government has
the authority under Article I of the Constitution to enact this federal civil-commitment pro-
gram or whether its doing so falls beyond the reach of a government 'of enumerated pow-
ers.' ").
08 Id. at 1957.
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Thomas dissented.
Many commentators following this case believe that this
shows that the Roberts Court will cease to continue the Rehnquist
Court's federalism resolution.' 09 I believe that constitutional histo-
rians will say that the greatest change in constitutional law during the
Rehnquist era was in the area of federalism, particularly in limiting
the scope of Congress's commerce power, restricting Congress's au-
thority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, reviving the
Tenth Amendment on the limit of federal power, and expanding the
states' sovereign immunity. "o However, to read this one case as the
Roberts Court's repudiation of, or unwillingness to, expand the deci-
sion is inaccurate. Almost all of the Rehnquist Court's federalism
decisions were five-to-four decisions, wherein Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas were in the majority."' These Justices continue to
sit on the Court today, and there is good reason to believe that Justic-
es Roberts and Alito see federalism the same way as Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas; thus, reading too much into this case is im-
prudent. Furthermore, the more interesting and high profile issues
now being returned to the lower courts for consideration all boil
down to federalism issues, as noted in three recent examples.
First, on July 8, 2010, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts held the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
unconstitutional.112 Judge Tauro stated that the government had no
legitimate interest in keeping gays and lesbians from being able to
marry one another and that the denial of federal benefits to same-sex
couples violated the Constitution." 3 However, ultimately, the De-
fense of Marriage Act is an issue of federalism. The question re-
mains whether Congress may declare that a state is not required to
recognize a same-sex marriage that occurred in another state.
Second, on July 28, 2010, the United States District Court of
109 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Bad News for Federalism? Some Preliminary Reflections on
Comstock, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 17, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/05/
17/bad-news-for-federalism-preliminary-reflections-on-comstock/ (stating the "Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Comstock is very bad news for constitutional federalism").
I to See Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 761, 777-79 (2008) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's effect on
state sovereignty and Congress's commerce power).
"' See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550 (1995).
112 See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 386 (D. Mass. 2010).
" Id. at 396-97.
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Arizona enjoined the key provisions of Senate Bill 1070,114 the Ari-
zona law requiring state and local police to enforce federal immigra-
tion law."' The central issue of this law concerns the presumptive
reach of federal immigration law," 6 which is obviously a question of
federalism. In a related issue, the Supreme Court granted review of
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Candelaria.117 Cande-
laria involves an Arizona law that prohibits businesses in Arizona
from employing undocumented immigrants; it provides that violators
will lose their business licenses and face other penalties."' While
similar ordinances and laws in other parts of the country-such as in
Hazleton, Pennsylvania-were declared unconstitutional on preemp-
tion grounds, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Arizona law." 9 The Su-
preme Court's decision in this case might be an indication of how it
will address Senate Bill 1070 when it reaches the Supreme Court.
The third recent example, a case decided on August 2, 2010,
pertains to a federal district court judge in Virginia who denied the
government's motion to dismiss a challenge to the federal health care
legislation; the challenge was premised on the scope of Congress's
commerce-attacking power.120
With all of these impending issues regarding federalism, it is
premature to assert that Comstock will put an end to what the Roberts
Court will do, or that Comstock represents the fact that the Roberts
Court will not necessarily extend what the Rehnquist Court did with
114 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010).
"' See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (precluding "law enforcement
officials and law enforcement agencies of this state or counties . . . from restricting or limit-
ing the enforcement of the federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by
federal law").
116 Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
"7 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010) (granting the writ of certiorari).
1 See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2009).
119 Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (deciding that
"the housing provisions of Hazleton's ordinances pre-empted regulations of immigration,
and both field and conflict pre-empted by the INA"), with Napolitano, 558 F.3d at 867, 869
(upholding the Arizona law while stating "[tihe Act's requirement that employers participate
in E-verify . .. does not raise conflict preemption concerns").
120 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(reducing the complex issue before the court to "the single question of whether or not Con-
gress has the power to regulate-and tax-a citizen's decision not to participate in interstate
commerce. ... [However] [g]iven the presence of some authority arguably supporting the
theory underlying each side's position, th[e] [c]ourt" denied the government's motion to
dismiss).
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regard to federalism.
III. FREE ENTERPRISE FUND V. PUBLIC COMPANYA CCOUNTING
OVERSIGHTBOARD: THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") was given the authority to appoint the
PCAOB's members.121 The SEC also has the authority to remove
members, but removal may only be for "good cause." 22  In other
words, the President is unable to either appoint or remove members
of the board. The issue before the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Boardl23 was wheth-
er this appointment violated the separation of powers doctrine.124
Free Enterprise Fund originally had the potential to be more
significant than it actually was because for years, conservatives ar-
gued that there is a unitary executive, meaning, among other things,
that all principal officers and inferior officers of the United States
must be removed by the President. In 1988, the Supreme Court in
Morrison v. Olson 25 upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Inde-
pendent Law in a seven-to-one ruling.126 Justice Scalia was the sole
dissenter, claiming that the President must be able to remove all prin-
cipal officers and inferior officers; however, based on the law, the
President was unable to remove independent counsel, and therefore,
121 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 ("Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . [which] introduced tighter regulation of the ac-
counting industry under a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The Board is
composed of five members[] appointed . .. by the Securities and Exchange Commission.");
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 750-52.
122 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148 (stating that "[t]he Commission cannot re-
move Board members at will, but only 'for good cause shown' "); see also Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 116 Stat. at 752.
123 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
124 Id. at 3149 (noting that the petitioners in this case argued "that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
contravened the separation of powers by conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board
members without subjecting them to Presidential control").
125 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
126 Id. at 658-60. The majority consisted of Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, Justice Scalia dissented, and Justice Kennedy "took no
part in the consideration ... of the case." Id. at 658.
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he believed that the law violated the separation of powers. 127 Justices
Roberts and Alito endorsed this unitary executive theory in memo-
randa written by them as young lawyers during the Reagan Adminis-
tration. 128
It is conceivable that if five votes on the current Court were in
support of the unitary executive theory, and the Court were to adopt
and follow it, all of the independent regulatory agencies may be held
unconstitutional because they all limit Presidential removal. Whether
it is the SEC, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), or the Federal
Communications Commission, the President may remove these
commissioners only for good cause.129 However, the Court declined
to accept the unitary executive theory and, instead, unanimously
upheld the Appointments Provision with regard to the PCAOB. 3 0
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, which did not
include any dissents. 131
Article II of the Constitution provides that Congress may vest
the appointment of inferior officers in the President, the department
heads, or the lower federal courts.132 The Court explained that under
precedent, the members of the PCAOB are considered inferior offic-
ers; they are inferior in terms of their authority in the SEC and the
127 Id. at 715, 723, 726-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he basic separation-of-powers prin-
ciples . . . are what give life and content to our jurisprudence concerning the President's
power to appoint and remove officers. The same result of unconstitutionality is . . . indicated
by our case law in these areas.").
128 See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. to the
Litig. -Strategy Working Group, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 2 (Feb. 5, 1986) (on file with the
Nat'l Archives), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-
269/AccO6O-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Febl986.pdf; see also Fact Check:
Judge Alito on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, DEMOCRATS.SENATE.GOV,
http://democrats.senate.gov/judiciarycommitteesupremecourt/correcting-12.cfm (last visited
Jan. 11, 2011); Robert Parry, Alito & The Ken Lay Factor, CONSORTIUM NEWS (Jan. 12,
2006), http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/011106.html.
129 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct 3138; Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 631-32 (1935) (holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act was constitutional and
did not interfere with the executive power of the President).
130 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162-63 (holding that "Board members [of the Com-
mission] are inferior officers whose appointment Congress may . .. vest in a 'Hea[d] of De-
partmen[t]' " and "that the Commission is indeed such a 'Departmen[t]' " and there is "no
reason why a multimember body may not be the 'Hea[d]' of a 'Departmen[t]' that it go-
verns").
13' Id. at 3146 (rejecting, unanimously, the challenge under the Appointments Clause,
however, there was a 5-4 majority regarding the dual for-cause mechanism as it pertains to
the removal of Oversight Board members).
132 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ability of the SEC to remove them.133  According to Chief Justice
Roberts, Congress may vest power of appointment authority of infe-
rior officers to the heads of departments, and, therefore, the SEC is
vested with the power of appointment. 134
In considering the removal provision, there was a five-to-four
split among the Justices who were divided along ideological lines. 135
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court and was joined
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.136  Justice Breyer
wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.13 7  Chief Justice Roberts noted that this
provision was different from others the Court previously upheld be-
cause in other cases, the President could remove the officer, or the
commissioners of, for example, the FTC, for "good cause." 38 Chief
Justice Roberts states this is different because the President is permit-
ted to remove the members of the SEC for "good cause," and the
SEC is permitted to remove members of the PCAOB for "good
cause." 39 Thus, a dual level of insulation exists.140 This type of in-
sulation rendered the removal provision unconstitutional according to
Chief Justice Roberts. 141
Justice Breyer dissented, urging a more functional approach
to the separation of powers doctrine and provided several examples,
133 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162 (agreeing "that the Commission is properly
viewed, under the Constitution, as possessing the power to remove Board members at will").
134 Id. at 3162-63.
131 Id. at 3146 (listing that Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion which Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined and Justice Breyer authored the dissenting opi-
nion which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined).
136 id
17 Id.
"3 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151-52 (stating " 'one who holds his office only dur-
ing the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of indepen-
dence against the latter's will' " and "that Congress had [the] power to . . . 'forbid their re-
moval except for cause' " (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629)).
" Id. at 3153-54.
'4 Id. at 3153.
The Act . . . does something quite different. It not only protects Board
members from removal except for good cause, but withdraws from the
President any decision on whether that good cause exists. . . . The result
is a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is
not responsible for the Board.
Id.
141 Id. at 3151.
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detailed in the appendix, noting that this arises all the time.142 He
pointed to the military as one of the many examples and indicated
that it is not so innocuous to say that the President's authority of re-
moval is effective with one level of protection, but not with two. 143
However, the Court still held that the insulation of removal of the
PCAOB violated the doctrine of separation of powers.1 "
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court was faced with vital issues last term in-
cluding incorporation of the Second Amendment, the federal gov-
ernment's power, and separation of powers. However, as a result of
its decisions in three particular cases, the Court has left several issues
unresolved. These issues include what standard of review will be ap-
plied in Second Amendment gun law cases, how the Court's decision
in Comstock will affect its determination of issues of federalism in
the future, and how the Roberts Court will determine separation of
powers issues in the future.
First, as a result of the decision in McDonald, the Court de-
termined that the Second Amendment is incorporated against the
states based on the Due Process Clause. However, the Court left
open for another day whether the remaining provisions of the Bill of
Rights will be incorporated in the future. By discussing the rights
that have not yet been incorporated, the Court has inevitably invited
litigation concerning such questions. Additionally, as a result of this
decision, the Court has also opened its doors, inviting litigation to
challenge all gun laws. The Court in McDonald, however, offered
little guidance as to what standard of review will be applied in such
cases in the future. Until the Supreme Court makes this determina-
tion, it is up to the lower courts to interpret the Court's decision in
McDonald and determine which standard of review should be ap-
142 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164-65, 3184-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("There are
[twenty-four] stand-alone federal agencies ... whose heads are, by statute, removable by the
President only 'for cause.' Moreover, there are at least [twenty-four] additional offices ...
that are similarly subject, by statute, to for-cause removal provisions.").
143 Id at 3181 (using the military as an example to reject the Court's holding regarding the
dual for-cause removal theory by stating "[iut is difficult to see why the Constitution would
provide a President .. . with less authority to remove 'inferior' military 'officers' than to re-
move comparable civil officials").
" See id. at 3151.
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plied.
Second, the Court's decision in Comstock leaves open the
question as to what stance the Roberts Court will take with regard to
federalism. Making a prediction on what the new dynamic of the
Court will decide in the future after one case is merely speculative.
Since there are many high profile issues regarding federalism current-
ly being decided in the lower courts, it remains premature to deter-
mine how the Court will decide such issues of federalism. It will be
interesting to see how the Court decides such cases in the future.
Lastly, the Court's decision in Free Enterprise Fund leaves
open the question on how similar cases will be decided in the future.
The decision had the potential of having a more significant implica-
tion; if one Justice had changed his or her position and adopted the
unitary executive theory, the Court's ruling would have had the effect
of declaring all independent regulatory agencies unconstitutional be-
cause they limit Presidential removal. Similar issues will continually
present themselves to the Court in the future, and it will be interesting
to see which Justices will fall on each side in such determinations.
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